On May 27, 2025, the Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the Honourable Dennis Galiatsatos of the Court of Québec (the “Judge”), who found that the requirement to translate written judgments issued in English “immediately and without delay” was inoperative in criminal proceedings. In its reasons delivered on August 8, 2025,[1] the Court of Appeal stated that the Judge could neither raise the constitutionality of this requirement on his own initiative, nor rule as he did, due to the Court of Québec’s limited jurisdiction over constitutional matters and the shortcomings in the procedure that was followed.
Summary of Facts and Procedural Background
On March 15, 2022, charges of dangerous driving, impaired driving and criminal negligence causing death were laid against the respondent, Ms. Christine Pryde. On April 29, 2022, Ms. Pryde pleaded not guilty and elected to be tried in English under section 530 of the Criminal Code[2] (“Cr.C.”).
Her trial was scheduled to begin on June 3, 2024, with amendments to section 10 of the Charter of the French Language[3] (the “C.F.L.”) set to take effect just a few days earlier, i.e., on June 1, 2024, as per An Act respecting French, the official and common language of Québec[4] (“Bill 96”).
Section 10 of the C.F.L., as amended by Bill 96, reads as follows:
“10. A French version shall be attached immediately and without delay to any judgment rendered in writing in English by a court of justice where the judgment terminates a proceeding or is of public interest.
(…)”
[Emphasis added, and paragraphs 2 and 3 omitted].
Less than two months before the beginning of Ms. Pryde’s trial, the Judge, who was then assigned to manage her case, raised on his own initiative the constitutionality of the above-mentioned translation requirement in anticipation of its coming into force. The Judge raised this issue given the delays he anticipated in translating the judgments, which, in his view, would have the effect of delaying their issuance until a French translation was also available, thereby interfering with the exercise of the federal head of power over criminal law.
In response, Ms. Pryde stated that she did not wish to challenge the constitutional validity of section 10 of the C.F.L., especially since such a debate would entail disproportionate delays and costs.
The Judge nevertheless required the presence of the attorneys general and therefore the transmission of a notice to the Attorney General of Quebec (the “AGQ”) and the Attorney General of Canada (the “AGC”) in accordance with sections 76 and following of the Code of Civil Procedure[5] (“C.C.P.”) with regard to three constitutional questions that he himself formulated[6].
The judge further concluded that he had jurisdiction to raise the constitutionality of section 10 of the C.F.L. on his own initiative in a 17-page judgment[7] delivered on the day this issue was debated, contrary to the arguments of the AGQ and the AGC. The Judge therefore required written submissions from the parties on the constitutionality of this section. Both the AGQ and Ms. Pryde supported the constitutional validity of section 10 C.F.L., whereas Québec’s Directeur des poursuites criminelles et pénales (DPCP) and the AGC refrained from adopting any position.
Trial Decision
On May 17, 2024, and less than 24 hours after receiving the parties’ written arguments, the Judge rendered a 33-page judgment[8] and declared the words “immediately and without delay” in section 10 of the C.F.L. to be inoperative in criminal proceedings:
“FOR THESE REASONS, the Court :
(…)
DECLARES INOPERABLE in criminal proceedings the words ‘immediately and without delay’.”
In this context, and since no party had argued that the requirement for an immediate and simultaneous French translation was invalid, the Judge included the following statement in his judgment:
“Note to the reviewing or appellate court: due to the nature of these proceedings, evidently, it is anticipated that neither party will attempt to defend this decision on appeal or on review. Given the procedural history, the evolving positions and certain strategic choices made by the Quebec Attorney-General, as well as the allegation of bias regarding this Court, I kindly ask that any appellate court insist on receiving a full record of the proceedings, including transcripts of all hearings and copies of all documents referred to herein. This is to ensure that the appellate court has the benefit of an accurate depiction of what occurred in the Provincial Court.”
Court of Appeal’s Reasons
The Court of Appeal first concluded that the Judge could not, on his own initiative, raise the issue of the constitutionality of section 10 C.F.L. since only higher court judges (including judges from the Superior Court) have the authority to issue a formal declaration of invalidity, which is valid in respect of all litigants. A judge of the Court of Québec has limited jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of a law, i.e., when the issue is raised in a proceeding the judge is properly seized of. In such a context, however, the judge’s decision applies only to the parties involved. In the case at hand, the Judge could not make a declaration of invalidity of general application or raise this issue on his own initiative. This is because the unconstitutionality of section 10 C.F.L. would not have affected Ms. Pryde’s verdict or sentence in any way and therefore constituted a departure from the matter before him. Additionally, no delay in rendering judgment had yet occurred in Ms. Pryde’s case. In other words, initiating and conducting this debate and ruling on this issue unilaterally and in anticipation of the coming into force of section 10 C.L.F. far exceeded the limits of the trial Judge’s jurisdiction.[9]
After determining that the foregoing reasons were sufficient to dispose of the appeal, the Court of Appeal also cautioned that in certain circumstances, a reasonable apprehension of bias may arise when a judge raises an issue on his/her own initiative. Although it did not formally rule on this issue, the Court of Appeal identified the following three elements as concerning: (1) a comment made by the Judge during the hearing,[10] (2) the Judge’s insistence on following an expedited schedule, and (3) the very short period of time between the end of two hearings and the time at which the Judge rendered his decisions, including the one under appeal.[11]
The Court of Appeal pointed out that, generally speaking, the haste with which the process was conducted was equally problematic. It also noted that the procedure followed in this case was so flawed that it would have been compelled to intervene even if the Judge’s decision had solely ruled on Ms. Pryde’s case. This is because the notice to the attorneys general was insufficient due to both its content and the short time limit they were thereby given to respond. This conclusion was reached despite the fact that, in this case, the minimum 30-day period[12] for serving notice to the AGQ and ACQ had been met.[13] To illustrate the insufficient nature of the notice, the Court of Appeal raised that the AGQ provided written arguments as detailed as it could within the too short timeframe it was given, and that the AGC simply did not participate in the debate, even though its perspective on practices accepted elsewhere in Canada under sections 530 and 530.1 Cr.C.[14] would have been useful.[15]
Takeaways and Remarks
Apart from the fact that the constitutionality of the words “immediately and without delay” in section 10 C.F.L. remains unresolved as of the publication date of this bulletin,[16] the Pryde decision illustrates that, in the context of a constitutional debate, the requirements governing its conduct must not be relaxed in a way that undermines its adversarial nature and makes resolving the issue unsound. To ensure a proper resolution after due consideration and with full knowledge of the facts, courts must ensure that any question of this nature is not decided based on pure speculation, within a flawed procedural framework or without the benefit of a well-documented context.
This is supported by decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, which state, among other things, that constitutional questions should not be considered in a factual vacuum, even in cases involving the division of powers.[17]
