In Amies v Lethbridge Family Services, 2025 AHRC 19, the Human Rights Tribunal of Alberta (the “Tribunal”) upheld the Director’s decision to dismiss a complaint for discrimination on the basis of mental disability after the Complainant’s employment was terminated on the same day that she returned from a year-long medical leave.
Background
Over the course of her employment with Lethbridge Family Services (the “Company”), the Complainant was implicated in three workplace investigations. At the conclusion of the third investigation, the Company met with the Complainant to discuss the results of the investigation and to give her an opportunity to provide further information.
The following day, the Complainant was hospitalized for mental health related reasons and was placed on medical leave by the Company. The Complainant remained on medical leave for approximately one year before she was able to return to work. On her first day back from leave, the Company terminated her employment.
As a result, the Complainant filed a human rights complaint against the Company for breaching s 7 of the Alberta Human Rights Act, RSA 2000 c A-25.5 (the “Act”) which prohibits discrimination on the basis of mental disability.
The Director dismissed the complaint and the Complainant filed a request for review of the Director’s decision under s 26 of the Act.
Analysis
As set out by the Alberta Court of King’s Bench in X v Alberta Human Rights Commission, 2022 ABKB 659, the standard for upholding the dismissal of a complaint requires that the complaint have no reasonable prospect of success.[1]
In her request for review of the Director’s decision, the Complainant argued that whether the Company had decided to terminate her employment before, during, or after her medical leave was an issue which required cross-examination in a hearing. The implication being that if the decision had been made either during or after her medical leave, then the medical leave had played a role in her termination and was therefore discriminatory.
The Tribunal ultimately disagreed, stating that “timing alone is not dispositive.” The Tribunal found that even if the decision to terminate her employment had been made once the Complainant had already commenced her medical leave, the timing alone was not sufficient to establish that her mental disability was a contributing factor in the termination. Similarly, the Complainant being terminated on the day that she returned from medical leave did not establish that her mental disability had contributed to the Company’s decision to terminate her employment.
Although the timing of the termination might appear to support an inference that the Complainant’s mental disability was a contributing factor in her termination, the evidence demonstrated that her termination was the result of the investigations and their findings.
The Tribunal noted that the investigation process contributed to the Complainant needing to take medical leave; however, this did not impact their decision.
Therefore, the Tribunal determined that the complaint had no reasonable prospect of success and upheld the Director’s decision to dismiss the complaint.
Key Takeaways
- This case confirms that the timing of a termination or a decision to terminate in relation to a leave of absence for a protected ground under the Act does not sufficiently establish that the protected ground was a contributing factor in the termination.
- For employers who are planning to terminate an individual who is subject to a protected ground under the Act following a leave of absence relating to that protected ground, it is advisable to obtain as much evidence and documentation as possible to establish the actual reason for the termination.
