Overview
The growth of the gig economy has fundamentally changed how many organizations deliver services and engage workers. From rideshare platforms and delivery services to consultants, franchise operators and other independent contractors, organizations are increasingly relying on non-traditional working relationships that fall outside the conventional employer-employee model.
In Sangha v. Lyft Canada Inc. (Sangha), the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (the “HRTO” or the “Tribunal”) considered whether a rideshare driver’s allegation of creed-based discrimination could proceed under the employment provisions of the Ontario Human Rights Code (the “Code”). Following a trilogy of decisions, the Tribunal ultimately concluded that the matter had been improperly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and that the analysis of whether the allegations arose “with respect to employment” ended prematurely once it was determined that the applicant was not an employee in the conventional sense. The Tribunal emphasized that independent contractor status does not automatically place a worker outside the scope of section 5 of the Code.
While the decision does not determine that rideshare drivers are employees, nor does it find that discrimination occurred on the merits, it serves as an important reminder that human rights protections may extend beyond traditional employment relationships. Organizations that engage independent contractors, platform workers and other non-traditional workers should be mindful that employment classifications developed in other legal contexts may not be determinative when assessing their obligations under the Code.
Facts
The Application was brought under section 5 of the Code, which prohibits discrimination “with respect to employment.” the company took the position that the applicant was not its employee. Rather, the company described itself as a ridesharing platform that matches riders with drivers and asserted that drivers operate as independent contractors who use the platform to locate customers and provide transportation services.
In August 2025, the Tribunal dismissed the Application without a hearing on the basis that it fell outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Tribunal concluded that the relationship between the parties did not engage any of the protected social areas under the Code, including employment, services, contracts, accommodation or vocational associations. The Tribunal found that the company was not the applicant’s employer and therefore dismissed the Application.
The applicant subsequently sought reconsideration. In October 2025, the Tribunal declined to exercise its discretion to reconsider the dismissal and concluded that the applicant had not established a basis for reconsideration under the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure. The applicant sought judicial review of the reconsideration.
However, while judicial review proceedings were underway, the Tribunal initiated its own reconsideration process and invited submissions from the parties on whether the original decisions were inconsistent with established jurisprudence. In July 2026, the Tribunal rescinded both earlier decisions and directed that the matter proceed to mediation.
The Tribunal’s Reconsideration Decision
An Expansive Approach to “Employment” Under the Code
The Tribunal’s reconsideration decision focused on the proper interpretation of the phrase “with respect to employment” under section 5 of the Code. In so doing, the Tribunal relied on Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) jurisprudence recognizing that human rights legislation requires an expansive approach to the concept of employment. According to the Tribunal, independent contractors may, in appropriate circumstances, be considered employees for human rights purposes even though they would not be treated as employees in other legal contexts.
The Tribunal emphasized that the question is not simply whether an individual is an employee in the conventional common law sense. Rather, the determination requires a fact-specific analysis of the relationship between the parties. In particular, the Tribunal noted that SCC jurisprudence contemplates a control-and-dependency analysis when determining whether a relationship constitutes employment for human rights purposes.
Importantly, the decision reinforces the distinction between employment status under employment statutes and common law principles, as compared to employment status under human rights legislation. The Tribunal recognized that a worker may be characterized differently depending on the legal context in which the issue arises.
As a result, organizations should be cautious about assuming that a worker’s status as an independent contractor necessarily resolves a human rights jurisdiction issue.
“With Respect to Employment” Is Broader Than Formal Employment Relationships
The Tribunal further observed that, in a number of previous HRTO decisions, the phrase “with respect to employment” has been interpreted broadly and is not limited to incidents arising within formal employment relationships.
Against that backdrop, the Tribunal concluded that the original jurisdictional analysis was incomplete and consequently rescinded both the original dismissal decision and the reconsideration decision. While the earlier decision noted that the applicant was not an employee of the company, the Tribunal held that the analysis effectively stopped there. In the Tribunal’s view, determining that a worker is an independent contractor does not exhaust the inquiry into whether allegations arise “with respect to employment” for the purposes of the Code. A broader human rights analysis is required.
Alternative Social Areas May Also Be Engaged
The reconsideration decision also noted that, even if the allegations did not ultimately engage the social area of employment, it was unclear why the Application would necessarily fall outside other protected social areas under the Code.
In particular, the Tribunal pointed to the possibility that the company’s platform could constitute a service provided to drivers. The Tribunal observed that the company’s platform enables drivers to connect with riders and earn income through those connections. The Tribunal therefore questioned why the allegations could not potentially engage the social area of services, goods and facilities.
The Tribunal also commented that a similar analysis could arise in relation to the social area of contracts. While the Tribunal did not reach any final conclusions on those issues, its comments underscore that a human rights claim will not necessarily fail simply because a complainant cannot establish a traditional employment relationship.
Key Takeaways for Employers
- This decision is an important reminder that independent contractor status is not necessarily dispositive under the Human Rights Code. A worker who is properly classified as an independent contractor for other legal purposes may nevertheless be able to pursue a human rights claim in appropriate circumstances. The ultimate outcome of this matter will warrant close monitoring.
- The Tribunal’s decision also reinforces the broad and purposive approach that courts and tribunals continue to apply when interpreting human rights legislation. Organizations should therefore be cautious about assuming that the absence of a conventional employment relationship will automatically remove a dispute from the scope of the Code.
- Importantly, the decision does not establish that gig workers or independent contractors are employees for all purposes, nor does it create new employment law entitlements for those workers.
- Organizations that engage contractors, consultants, platform workers and other non-traditional workers should ensure that their policies, practices and decision-making processes are assessed through a human rights lens.
